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From Information to Action: Right-to-Know
Laws in the European Community
Margaret C. Liut
'Laws requiring the communication of hazardous substance
data, community right-to-know laws, are recent developments in
environmental regulation. Community right-to-know laws focus on
industry's use and release of hazardous substances and the attend-
ant health and environmental risks of such use. Their- goal is to
reduce both use and emissions levels. However, unlike environmen-
tal laws that command and control industry's use of hazardous
substances through regulatory standards or economic incentives,
right-to-know laws rely on information-based public action to en-
courage change.'
The concept of a right to know addresses numerous facets of
pollution prevention: industry's duty to disclose information per-
taining to its use of hazardous substances, the public's right to ac-
cess such information, and the community's need to develop emer-
gency notification and response plans for accidental release. This
Comment focuses primarily on reporting requirements for hazard-
ous substance storage, use, and release created by right-to-know
statutes and on the right of the public to obtain such data.
Both the United States and the European Community ("EC")
have established community right-to-know standards. Right-to-
know law in the United States is set out in the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"), which obli-
gates industry to report hazardous chemical data and requires gov-
ernmental authorities to disclose such data.2 Similarly, the EC has
t A.B. 1988, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Chicago.
' The information produced by right-to-know laws also benefits other environmental
regulation schemes. Data collected can be used to revise and implement command- and con-
trol-type standards and can also be used to improve enforcement of existing environmental
laws. See General Accounting Office, Toxic Chemicals: EPA's Toxic Release Inventory is
Useful but Can Be Improved 20-24 (GAO, June 1991).
2 Pub L No 99-499, Title III, §§ 300-30, 100 Stat 1728 (1986), codified at 42 USC
§§ 11001-50 (1988).
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adopted a set of directives establishing a framework for community
right-to-know laws in the individual Member States.'
EC right-to-know laws are less developed than their counter-
parts in the United States. The EC directives establish the ground-
work and rely on each Member State to implement provisions
through domestic legislation. Whereas Community standards for
industrial disclosure of hazardous chemical data were initially
adopted in 1982, the 1990 Directive on Freedom of Access to Infor-
mation on the Environment only recently established perhaps the
most important component of a right-to-know regime-broad pub-
lic access to such information.
Right-to-know laws depend on public action for their success.
If made available, information should drive individuals to make
the correct economic and political decisions concerning industry's
use of toxic substances. Therefore, the challenge in creating an ef-
fective right-to-know regime lies in providing to the public suffi-
cient, comprehensible data. In the EC, this task falls on both the
Community government and the national governments.
Part I of this Comment examines the reasoning behind infor-
mation strategies and the mechanisms through which right-to-
know laws can improve industrial behavior. Parts II and III ex-
amine, respectively, EC right-to-know standards and U.S. right-to-
know laws. Part IV examines some of the problems of informa-
tional remedies, namely cognitive dysfunctions that inhibit the
proper functioning of such laws and undermine the efficacy of such
strategies. Finally, Part V analyzes the functions of right-to-know
laws in the EC and proposes measures to enhance their
effectiveness.
I. FUNCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL REMEDIES
Informational strategies address two intertwined characteris-
tics of industrial use of toxic chemicals: externalities (third party
costs) and failures in the distribution and use of information (mar-
ket failures of information).' Often, industry will not fully internal-
ize the associated environmental and health costs of its use of toxic
Council Dir 82/501, 1982 OJ L230:1 (On the major-accident hazards of certain indus-
trial activities); Council Dir 88/610, 1988 OJ L336:14 (Amending Directive 82/501/EEC on
the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities); Council Dir 90/313, 1990 OJ
L158:56 (On the freedom of access to information on the environment).
' Council Dir 90/313, art 1, 1990 OJ at L158:57 (cited in note 3).
' For a discussion of externalities and market failures of information, see Executive
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the
United States Government 33, 653-54 (US Gov't Printing Ofc, 1989).
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chemicals:6 a facility may not, and perhaps cannot, bear the full
costs of its industrial processes. It thus passes on to others certain
costs. This problem can be attributed, in part, to industry's igno-
rance of the full environmental effects of its operations. Reporting
requirements, therefore, can make a company more aware of the
externalities involved in its use of hazardous substances. 7
Whether or not industry fully recognizes the ecological and
health risks its operations pose, externalities will exist as long as
industry knows more about the effects of its hazardous chemical
than the public. Right-to-know laws seek to correct this disparity
in information,8 while also addressing the larger externality prob-
lem of environmental risks.
Distinct from command and control strategies, informational
remedies seek to affect industry conduct through public action. Be-
cause the risks associated with hazardous chemical use are often
not apparent, informational strategies possess particular impor-
tance. Making hazardous substance data available to the public en-
ables individuals to act in the market, political, and public arenas,
and in the courts to create more environmentally sound industrial
practices. Informational remedies give individuals the data they
need to express their political and economic preferences,' without
inhibiting preference formation or precautionary behavior. 10
Right to know laws can be as effective as more costly com-
mand and control strategies in reducing a facility's use or release
of a hazardous substance. Command and control strategies restrict
both industrial and public choice. Conversely, right-to-know laws
give both individuals and society the information they need to
properly assess the costs and benefits of industrial action, thereby
enabling them to negotiate for the optimal levels of environmental/
health protection and industrial activity.1" Because right-to-know
laws use the formation and exercise of personal preferences to
drive the cost-benefit analysis, they are more flexible and efficient
than their command and control counterparts.
6 Marcia R. Gelpe, Organizing Themes of Environmental Law, 16 Wm Mitchell L Rev
897, 899 (1990).
7 Id at 909.
8 Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to
Produce and Use Data, 87 Mich L Rev 1795, 1830 (1989).
" Id at 1831.
10 W. Kip Viscusi and Wesley Magat, Learning about Risk: Consumer and Worker Re-
sponses to Hazard Information 60, 126 (Harvard U Press, 1987).
" Lyndon, 87 Mich L Rev at 1830 (cited in note 8).
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A. The Market Function
Individuals frequently express their preferences with their
pocketbooks. Consumer choice depends on sufficient information
regarding a good's relevant characteristics. Potential risks consti-
tute part of the bundle of characteristics that any given good pos-
sesses. 12 An informed consumer can balance the risks of a certain
economic decision against its benefits.'" Even if risks cannot be
calculated with precision or certainty, more useable and reliable
information should enable the consumer to more accurately value
the risks associated with a given product.
This market function of informational strategies works partic-
ularly well in the area of consumer goods, where the buyer makes
purchases based on knowledge of the product or group of products
concerned. In such circumstances, sufficient, accurate, and prop-
erly presented labelling, as well as other information programs, fa-
cilitates informed consumer choice. 14
However, with respect to environmental hazards resulting
from industrial processes, information-based market strategies
may not function as well."5 Industries whose processes adversely
affect the environment may not themselves directly produce a good
that affected individual consumers buy. Neither the individual ul-
timately purchasing an end-product, nor the customer of an indus-
trial facility, necessarily has the same incentives as an individual
who will bear the environmental and health costs imposed by that
same facility."l Therefore, informed individual purchasing deci-
sions may not improve industrial conduct and attitudes."
B. The Democratic Function
In addition to improving economic decisionmaking, right-to-
know laws serve an important democratic function. The availabil-
ity of information affects not only individual economic decisions, it
also affects political choices.' Information enables the public to
12 Peter Asch, Consumer Safety Regulation: Putting a Price on Life and Limb 88-89
(Oxford U Press, 1988).
13 Viscusi & Magat, Learning about Risk at 60 (cited in note 10).
14 For a detailed discussion of consumer response to labelling, see W. Kip Viscusi, Pre-
dicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 Food Drug Cosm L J
283 (1988).
W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 160 (Harvard U Press, 1991).
Id.
17 Id.
18 Robert F. Blomquist, The Logic and Limits of Public Information Mandates under
Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A Policy Analysis, 14 Vt L Rev 559, 563 (1990).
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identify and hold accountable polluters, thereby facilitating in-
formed political choice."9 This democracy-enhancing feature is es-
sential for improving industrial practices: disclosure of hazardous
substance data provides impetus for public pressure, particularly
at the state and local level, on both government and industry.20
This feature of informational remedies allows a community, once
fully informed, to negotiate for optimal, preference-driven levels of
risk and exposure.2
Right-to-know laws, by imposing reporting requirements, also
heighten industry awareness of the environmental effects of its op-
erations. This increased awareness may generate greater concern
for the firm's legal liabilities, thereby encouraging voluntary ac-
tion 22 to reduce environmental and health risks to reduce such lia-
bility. Specifically, EPCRA's reporting requirements have pres-
sured industry to change its use of hazardous substances.23 In the
aftermath of Bhopal and other similar disasters during the 1980s, 24
companies have also become acutely image conscious. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has used reporting require-
ments as a means of encouraging voluntary initiatives. 5 Compa-
nies have responded and have often sought to preempt or mitigate
negative public attention and reputational harm by voluntarily es-
" Keith Schneider, For Communities, Knowledge of Polluters is Power, NY Times 4-5
(Mar 24, 1991) (quoting Mary Lee Orr, Director of the Louisiana Environmental Action
Network).
20 Blomquist, 14 Vt L Rev at 563 (cited in note 18). For example, the Silicon Valley
Toxics Coalition used data generated by EPCRA to pressure an IBM facility to begin phas-
ing out use of ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"). The facility was the largest
CFC emitter in California. Environmental Protection Agency, Toxics in the Community:
National and Local Perspectives 323 (US Gov't Printing Ofc, 1991).
21 Informational remedies might prove important to a community forced to choose be-
tween the environmental benefits of closing a facility and the cost in jobs that such closure
may incur. The community can reach the best compromise if it is fully informed as to both
the costs and benefits of the industrial operation.
12 Schneider, NY Times at 4-5 (cited in note 19).
23 In September 1990, nine companies entered into voluntary agreements with the EPA
pledging an 80 percent reduction in toxic emissions by the end of 1993. These agreements
cover 40 of the nation's worst polluters. EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, attributed
this progress to the reporting requirements of EPCRA. George Lobsenz, Toxic Reductions
Promised at 40 Worst-Polluting Plants, United Press Intl (Sept 19, 1990).
14 See, for examples, Robert Abrams and Douglas H. Ward, Prospects for Safer Com-
munities: Emergency Response, Community Right to Know, and Prevention of Chemical
Accidents, 14 Harv Env L Rev 135, 141-43 (1990) (discussing accidental toxic substance
releases in Basel, Switzerland; Seveso, Italy; and Institute, West Virginia).
"' Lobsenz, Toxic Reductions (cited in note 23).
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tablishing emissions reduction targets and replacing hazardous
substances with less toxic ones.2"
C. The Civil Liability Function
In the United States, right-to-know laws also use private liti-
gation to change industrial behavior. As the amount of civil litiga-
tion and the size of jury awards increases, public awareness of haz-
ardous substance risks can only rise, thereby encouraging
additional litigation.27 Right-to-know laws, by properly organizing
and presenting hazardous substance information, thus spur litiga-
tion: they can help establish causation by connecting a facility's
operations to the plaintiff's alleged harms, they can help identify
defendants, and they can facilitate discovery.2" Additionally, as
noted above, the mere threat of litigation, with its attendant costs
and damage to reputation, has encouraged industry to voluntarily
alter its use of hazardous substances. 9
II. EC FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHT-TO-KNOW REGIMES
EC right-to-know laws were enacted in the early 1980s in re-
sponse to the threat posed by major chemical accidents. More re-
cently, these laws have been broadened to enhance public aware-
ness by encouraging disclosure of hazardous chemical data.
A. The Seveso Directive
The EC adopted a directive in 1982 on Major-Accident
Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, commonly known as the
Seveso Directive."° The Seveso Directive seeks to "prevent[] the
creation of pollution or nuisances at source" by creating Commu-
20 In December 1990, Chevron ceased its use of chlorine at one refinery after environ-
mental groups began voicing concerns about the storage and use of this chemical. Also in
December of 1990, Raytheon, reacting to criticism from a citizens' group, pledged to replace
ozone-depleting cleaning agents with safer, water-based solutions. Schneider, NY Times at
4-5 (cited in note 19).
27 For an example of such litigation, see John Riley, Environmental Group Tries to
Nail Kodak, Gannett News Service (March 14, 1990).
28 Lyndon, 87 Mich L Rev at 1833 (cited in note 8).
29 GAO, Toxic Chemicals at 24 (cited in note 1).
30 Council Dir 82/501, 1982 OJ at L230:1 (cited in note 3). This directive is named after
the Italian city of Seveso, site of a major dioxin release from a Hoffman LaRoche plant in
1978. Michael S. Baram, Risk Communication Law and Implementation Issues in the
United States and the European Community, 6 BU Intl L J 21, 27 (1988).
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nity standards for manufacturers who use hazardous substances. 1 °
As originally adopted, the Directive requires facilities to inform
relevant state authorities of the chemicals it uses and stores, the
risks and hazards posed by such substances, and the safety and
emergency-response measures it has adopted to minimize such
risks.32
Under the Seveso Directive, all parties engaged in industrial
activity involving or possibly involving dangerous substances and
"capable of presenting major accident-hazards" must "identif[y]
existing major-accident hazards. '3 3 Article 5 of the Directive re-
quires businesses to disclose the following types of information
pertaining to their use of hazardous chemicals: substances stored
or used by a facility-including by-products, residues, quantities
present, and chemical behavior during normal conditions of use;
type of production and storage; and nature of the technical
processes employed .3  Additionally, under Article 5, companies
must disclose short- and long-term environmental and health risks
posed by their use of hazardous substances.3
The Seveso Directive does not establish measures to ensure
compliance with its reporting requirements. It leaves this to the
Member States. 6 The Directive does, however, authorize relevant
national authorities to evaluate information disclosed pursuant to
the Directive, to request supplementary information, and to con-
duct on-site investigations.3 7
' Council Dir 82/501, preamble, 1982 OJ at L230:1 (cited in note 3). As used in the
Seveso Directive, "manufacturer" describes any person responsible for
any operation carried out in an industrial installation . . . involving . . . one or
more dangerous substances and capable of presenting major-accident hazards, and
also transport carried out within the establishment for internal reasons and the
storage associated with this operation within the establishment.
Id, art 1(2)(a)-(b), 1982 OJ at L230:2.
32 Id, arts 3-5, 1982 OJ at L230:3-4.
"' Id, art 1(2)(a), 1982 OJ at L230:2; id, art 4, 1982 OJ at L230:3.
3' Council Dir 82/501, art 5, 1982 OJ at L230:3; annex V, 1982 OJ at L230:16 (cited in
note 3). Annex V specifies data and information to be supplied in connection with the notifi-
cation provided for in Article 5.
35 Id, annex V, 1982 OJ at L230:16. The provisions of the Directive apply to both ex-
isting and new industrial activities. Id, art 9, 1982 OJ at L230:4-5.
" However, Community-level procedures do exist to enforce the Directive against
Member States that do not comply with the Directive's requirements. Rolf Wagenbaur, The
European Community's Policy on Implementation of Environmental Directives, 14 Ford-
ham Intl L J 455, 461-65 (1990-91).
" Council Dir 82/501, art 7, 1982 OJ at L230:4 (cited in note 3). This inspection and
review authority can also assist national authorities in imposing, through domestic law,
technical and system requirements on facilities. Baram, 6 BU Intl L J at 29 (cited in note
30).
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The "right to know" encompasses not only industry's obliga-
tion to disclose chemical risk data, but also, and perhaps more im-
portantly, the dissemination of such information to the public. Ar-
ticle 8 of the original Seveso Directive requires Member States to
ensure that persons liable to be affected by a major acci-
dent originating in a notified industrial activity .. .are
informed in an appropriate manner of the safety mea-
sures and of the correct behavior to adopt in the event of
an accident.3 8
The policy behind this provision, therefore, focused not on public
disclosure, but rather on providing the specific information that af-
fected individuals "need to know"3 9 in the event of accidental
release. °
Article 8 was amended in 1988 by a Directive enacted to
strengthen and better define the public information components of
the Seveso Directive."' The amended language of the Seveso Direc-
tive now provides that
Member States shall ensure that the information on
safety measures and on the correct behaviour to adopt in
the case of an accident is supplied in an appropriate
manner, and without their having to request it, to per-
sons liable to be affected by a major accident. . . .[Such
information] shall also be made publicly available.2
These amendments also specify the types of information to be
communicated to the public, including such data as the common
names of on-site hazardous substances, an "indication of their
principal dangerous characteristics,"' 3 and "[g]eneral information
relating to the nature of the major-accident hazards, including
their potential effects on the population and the environment.'""
Although these amendments broaden Member States' obliga-
tions to include the dissemination of data to the general public, the
8 Council Dir 82/501, art 8, 1982 OJ at L230:4 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
" Baram, 6 BU Intl L J at 29 (cited in note 30).
40 See Council Dir 82/501, art 8, 1982 OJ at L230:4 (cited in note 3). Additionally, Arti-
cle 4 of the Directive provides for notification of workers of relevant safety information. Id,
art 4, 1982 OJ at L230:3.
" Council Dir 88/610, preamble, 1988 OJ at L336:14 (cited in note 3).
42 Id, art 1, 1988 OJ at L336:14-15 (emphasis added). Unless otherwise indicated, all
subsequent references to the Seveso Directive refer to the Directive as amended by the 1988
Directive.
43 Id, annex B, 1988 OJ at L336:18.
" Council Dir 88/610, annex B, 1988 OJ at L336:18 (cited in note 3).
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content of this obligation is left undeveloped, with no specifics on
the means or extent of public disclosure. Additionally, the infor-
mation disclosed remains limited to, primarily, that needed to re-
spond properly to an accidental release.49
Implementation of the Seveso Directive remains incomplete.'
Although most Member States have developed emergency response
programs pursuant to the Directive's guidelines,46 the Member
States have been inconsistent in implementing risk communication
standards. Consequently, some nations have minimal reporting re-
quirements while others47 have more extensive requirements that
predate implementation of the Seveso Directive. 8
B. The Information Directive
Recent EC Council action may establish broad standards for
public disclosure of hazardous chemical data. With respect to pub-
lic disclosure, the 1990 Directive on the Freedom of Access to In-
formation on the Environment ("Information Directive") suggests
a way to remedy the Seveso Directive's shortcomings."9 Notwith-
standing certain narrow exceptions,5" the Information Directive di-
rects Member States to:
ensure that public authorities are required to make avail-
able information relating to the environment to any nat-
ural or legal person at his request and without his having
to probe an interest.5 1
Member States must fully implement these provisions through do-
mestic legislation by the end of 1992.52 The language of the Infor-
mation Directive seems to amend the original Seveso Directive lan-
" See id.
4 Restrictive Waste Management Measures Expected from Commission, Attorney
Says, 13 Intl Env Rptr Current Rpt 149 (1990).
47 Id.
" The general record of the Member States' progress in implementing environmental
directives is poor and a matter of concern to Community authorities. See Wdgenbaur, 14
Fordham Intl L J at 455 (cited in note 36).
49 Council Dir 90/313, 1990 OJ at L158:56 (cited in note 3).
60 Data exempted from the reporting requirements of the information directive include
information affecting commercial and industrial confidentiality, such as trade secrets. Id, art
3(2), 1990 OJ at L158:57.
11 Id, art 3(1), 1990 OJ at L158:57- (emphasis added).
6 Id, art 9, 1990 OJ at L158:58.
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guage to give the public access to virtually all hazardous substance
data.5"
III. RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Congress, spurred by unions, public interest groups, and
events such as the Bhopal disaster, 54 enacted the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA") as Title III
of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA").55 Described by some as a prime example of Reagan's
"new federalism,"5 6 EPCRA distributes the burden of policing in-
dustrial disclosure and use of hazardous substances among federal,
state, and local governments, as well as private individuals.5 7 EP-
CRA seeks to improve both emergency planning and public access
to information. It imposes extensive reporting requirements on in-
dustry, mandates public access to reported information, and cre-
ates a multi-tiered system of hazard communication, emergency
planning, and enforcement.5 8
EPCRA requires states to establish Emergency Response
Commissions and local Emergency Planning Committees .5  These
state and local authorities, as well as the EPA, serve as the reposi-
tories of the hazardous substance data generated by EPCRA.6 0
Under EPCRA, manufacturers, processors, and users of hazardous
substances must complete three forms: (1) they must submit mate-
rial safety data sheets to state and local authorities;1 (2) they
must also submit emergency and hazardous chemical inventory
forms to the same authorities;62 and (3) they' must submit toxic
chemical release forms to federal and state authorities.63 Like the
Seveso Directive, these provisions mandate disclosure of virtually
every aspect of industrial use of hazardous chemicals: hazardous
components of chemicals used,64 description of storage, 5 average
" See Council Dir 90/313, preamble, 1990 OJ at L158:56-57, art 3(2), 1990 OJ at
L158:57 (cited in note 3).
Abrams & Ward, 14 Harv Env L Rev at 135 (cited in note 24).
Pub L No 99-499, Title 1II, §§ 300-30, 100 Stat 1728 (1986), codified at 42 USC
§§ 11001-50 (1988).
" Baram, 6 BU Intl L J at 37 (cited in note 30).
17 See 42 USC §§ 11001, 11021-23, 11045, 11046.
88 See 42 USC §§ 11001, 11003-05, 11021-23, 11044-46.
6 42 USC §§ 11001(a), 11001(c).
60 See 42 USC §§ 11021-23.
61 42 USC § 11021.
62 42 USC § 11022.
63 42 USC § 11023.
604 42 USC § 11021(a)(2)(A)(iii).
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daily amounts present,66 specific locations of chemicals within a fa-
cility,67 nature of use,68 annual quantities released into the envi-
ronment,69 and estimates of the efficiency of treatment programs. 0
Although both EPCRA and the Seveso Directive require in-
dustry to disclose hazardous chemical data, EPCRA places greater
emphasis on the public access component of a right-to-know re-
gime. While the amended Seveso Directive, in conjunction with the
Information Directive, may create a very broad public right to haz-
ardous substance data, EPCRA explicitly states that:
[e]ach emergency response plan, material safety data
sheet, . . . inventory form, . . . [and] toxic chemical re-
lease form .... shall be made available to the general
public. 1
This provision clearly requires relevant federal, state, and local au-
thorities to disclose to the public any information they obtain.
EPCRA also establishes several different enforcement mecha-
nisms at every level of government.72 The statute establishes ad-
ministrative and civil penalties for failure to comply with reporting
requirements. At the federal level, a person or entity that violates
reporting requirements can be held liable for up to $25,000 per
day, per violation.73 Empirical data indicate that the EPA has suc-
cessfully enforced EPCRA,74 though limited resources have re-
stricted the number of enforcement actions it has been able to ini-
tiate.7 1 The EPA has also used EPCRA enforcement measures to
encourage industry to reduce its use of hazardous substances. It
has entered into consent decrees with companies, reducing fines
65 42 USC §11022(d)(2)(D).
Go 42 USC §11022(d)(2)(C).
67 42 USC § 11022(d)(2)(E). The owner of a facility may request that the location of a
hazardous chemical be withheld from public disclosure. 42 USC § 11044(a).
42 USC § 11023(g)(1)(C)(i).
42 USC § 11023(g)(1)(C)(iv).
70 42 USC § 11023(g)(1)(C)(iii).
71 42 USC § 11044(a).
72 42 USC § 11045-46.
11 42 USC § 11045(c).
, See EPA Seeks $525,000 from Mobil Oil of Paulsboro, N.J., for Notification Failures
under Right-To-Know Law, PR Newswire (June 25, 1991); EPA Slaps Fines on Boeing Co.,
Seattle Steel, The Seattle Times HI (Dec 19, 1990); Mary Ann Gwinn, EPA Levies Prece-
dent-Setting Fine against O-Cel-O Division of General Mills of Tonawanda, N.Y. for a
Hazardous Chemical Release, PR New~wire (Nov 16, 1990); EPA Announces Enforcement
Initiative Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, PR New-
swire (Oct 22, 1990).
75 GAO, Toxic Chemicals at 49-57 (cited in note 1).
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where firms agree to implement new technologies or to replace
chemicals currently in use with less toxic substances.76
EPCRA also authorizes civil claims by state and local govern-
ments against facility owners and operators for failure to submit
the required information." However, EPCRA, unlike the Seveso
Directive, does not grant explicit inspection authority as part of its
enforcement procedures.78 Finally, EPCRA creates a private right
of action; "any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf" against an owner or operator who fails to properly meet
EPCRA reporting requirements.
79
IV. COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTIONS
Laws designed to correct failures of information, in order to be
effective, must generate data that the public can understand. An
informational strategy should not merely provide for total disclos-
ure, but should also inform in a manner that fosters improved
decisionmaking5 ° Right-to-know regimes must account for limited
information processing ability and deficiencies in the information
actually produced.
Individuals must understand and order new data for it to af-
fect their political and economic decisions.81 New data must first
be accepted. It must convince individuals to alter their under-
standing of the environmental impact of industrial use of hazard-
ous substances.8 2 It must thus possess sufficient authority and va-
lidity to cause individuals to rethink their valuations of
environmental and health risks.8 3
Even if accepted, cognitive dysfunctions can still impair the
use of newly acquired data. An individual's ability to absorb and
process new data is not unlimited. Individuals who are over-
'e Four New Jersey Firms Agree to Improve Facility Operations to Benefit Environ-
ment; EPA Collects $45,000 for Right-to-Know Violations, PR Newswire (January 24,
1991).
"' 42 USC § 11046(a)(2).
78 See GAO, Toxic Chemicals at 55 (cited in note 1). In practice; EPA regional inspec-
tors do conduct investigations to identify facilities that violate EPCRA reporting require-
ments, though facility operators have challenged the EPA's authority to conduct such inves-
tigations. Therefore, the EPA must often rely on authority provided under other
environmental statutes. Id.
7' 42 USC § 11046 (a)(1).
go Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability at 133 (cited in note 15).
81 Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America through Law 19 (Dec 1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
82 Viscusi & Magat, Learning About Risk at 7 (cited in note 10).
83 Id at 126.
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whelmed with new data may forget an important portion of it or
may fail to properly process it.84 Without some means of analyzing
and ordering the data, particularly large amounts of data, individ-
uals cannot properly value it.5 5 These quantitative limits may thus
render information-based regulation ineffectual, 6 because right-to-
know statutes may generate unmanageable amounts of environ-
mental and toxic chemical data.8 7
Moreover, individuals may be qualitatively limited in the
types of data that they can digest. Much of the data generated by
right-to-know laws consists of "raw" data. Such information may
not enable the public to better assess the risks an industrial facility
presents. To digest such data, one may have to process highly com-
plex and technical information and reduce it to a form more ame-
nable to risk-benefit analysis. Without assistance, individuals are
likely to make errors that can distort risk valuation.
Complex raw data, when married with scientific uncertainty,
may make individual risk valuations so flawed as to be of little or
no assistance in regulating industry use of hazardous chemicals.8
The environmental and health effects of chemicals may not yet be
known. If science cannot accurately determine the hazards associ-
ated with a particular industrial operation, individuals probably
cannot be expected to properly assess the risks posed by such an
operation.
Uncertainty about the risks associated with the use of particu-
lar chemicals may also result in individual inaction. Uncertainty
generates anxiety. To reduce such-anxiety, individuals may deny
uncertainty and undervalue the risks posed by present use levels.90
84 Id at 140.
88 Id.
88 However, Professor Lyndon suggests that this difficulty does not exist, as individuals
frequently deal with large amounts of complex data. Lyndon, 87 Mich L Rev at 1831 (cited
in note 8).
87 Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability at 139-40 (cited in note 15).
88 See Asch, Consumer Safety Regulation at 91-94 (cited in note 12) (where individuals
moderately underestimate risks, only the mildly safety-conscious individual will change his
preferences; moderate overestimation of risk will affect only moderately price-conscious
consumers).
88 See id at 158. This time lag between exposure and the manifestation of its effects
creates significant difficulties in any hazardous substance, regulatory regime. These difficul-
ties include establishing effective production and technology standards and determining
when liability should attach so that tort claims can create effective risk reduction incentives.
90 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Informing the Public about
the Risks from Ionizing Radiation, in Hal R. Arkes and Kenneth R. Hammond, eds, Judg-
ment and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader 114, 117 (Cambridge U Press,
1986).
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Also, because the hazards associated with toxic substance use gen-
erally involve future risks, the potential for error increases and
confidence in one's ability to properly value risks diminishes.,1
Beyond these difficulties, even unambiguous information may
provoke improper response. Individuals may overestimate the like-
lihood of low probability events.2 If they fail to analyze or priori-
tize risk data, they may overestimate the likelihood of rare, but
highly sensational and publicized, toxic substance catastrophes."
V. PROPOSAL FOR EC MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION
Existing EC directives provide little more than the skeleton
for a right-to-know regime. Architects of domestic implementing
legislation, as well as of future Community initiatives, must retain
the most effective functions of informational remedies while ad-
dressing those cognitive dysfunctions that inhibit proper and effec-
tive information-based public action. Within this framework, a
right-to-know regime, aggressively enforced at the national level
and using Community institutions to process and coordinate haz-
ardous substance data, would do much to enhance the effectiveness
of EC regulation of hazardous substance use.
A. Weaknesses of the Market and the Civil Liability Functions
Whether in the United States or in the EC, if no transaction
exists between the polluter and those bearing the risks associated
* with his industrial processes, individual consumer choices may
have little persuasive or coercive effect. Therefore, market-based
strategies alone may fail to create the incentives needed to change
industrial behavior.
Moreover, the incentive effect of the threat of civil litigation in
the EC is much less than that in the United States. European atti-
tudes toward litigation differ greatly from the litigious inclinations
of many in the United States. Americans frequently tend to view
' Richard H. Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy, in Arkes & Hammond,
eds, Judgment and Decision Making at 165.
92 Viscusi & Magat, Learning About Risk at 128 (cited in note.10).
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability at 135 (cited in note 15). See also Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Informing the Public at 116 (cited in note 90). The authors cite a
1978 study demonstrating that:
the frequencies of dramatic or sensational causes of death, such as accidents,
homicide, cancer ... and tornadoes, were greatly overestimated, [whereas]
[f]requencies of undramatic causes, such as asthma . . . and diabetes, which take
one life at a time and are common in nonfatal form, were greatly underestimated.
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lawsuits as a viable means of resolving disputes and redressing
wrongs. Conversely, Europeans do not feel that "they have a God-
given right to go to court as people in the U.S. do,"9 ' and thus
"you don't have attorneys running around dropping cards."95
Procedural and substantive elements of European legal sys-
tems also may make litigation a less attractive alternative than in
the United States. With respect to procedure, class actions are ex-
tremely rare, 6 and plaintiffs assume substantial economic risks in
initiating suits: not only are contingency fees nonexistent 7 but the
United Kingdom and some other EC countries also require a losing
plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorney fees and costs.9 8 A litigant
faces additional hurdles in Civil Law countries: the dearth of pre-
trial discovery and of compelled discovery of documents and wit-
nesses create significant difficulties in adducing the proof needed
to recover damages.9 Even in common law countries such as the
United Kingdom, whose system resembles that of the United
States,"' the scope of discovery remains quite limited. 1 1
With respect to substance, the financial rewards of civil litiga-
tion in the EC countries simply do not approach those of United
States jury awards. Generally, civil matters are not tried before a
jury, awards are limited to actual damages and related expenses,
and courts virtually never award punitive and trebled damages. 2
Despite these differences, European legal systems may be
moving toward more civil actions and larger awards. 03 A pending
" David C. Jones, U.S.-Style Litigation Not Seen Invading EC, Property & Casualty/
Risk & Benefits Management Edition 35 (Aug 27, 1990) (quoting Sheila O'Donnell, attorney
with Thieffry & Associates, Paris, France).
" Meg Fletcher, Events Abroad Trouble Risk Managers at Home, Bus Ins 14, 16 (Oct
22, 1990) (quoting Harold Lang, Director, Insurance and Risk Management, Kohler Co.).
" Patrick Thieffry, Arbitration Expected to Increase New Incentives, Natl L J 21
(Mar 19, 1990).
9' One European lawyer has described contingency fees as "not only illegal, but im-
moral as well." Jones, Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management Edition at 35
(quoting Sheila O'Donnell, attorney with Thieffry & Associates, Paris, France) (cited in note
94).
" Id at 48.
Id.
English Justice: The Slow and Costly Civil Courts, The Economist 52 (August 20,
1983).
101 Jones, Property & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management Edition at 48 (cited in
note 94).
'0o See id. See also Thieffry, Natl L J at 21 (cited in note 96).
1 Baram, 6 BU Intl L J at 25 (cited in note 30). See also, David P. Hackett, "New
Developments in International Environmental Law" (Nov 15, 1991) (speech delivered at the
University of Chicago Law School) (on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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Community proposal may signal and encourage such a trend.""
The proposed directive holds waste generators strictly liable' for
any environmental damage they may cause and makes them jointly
and severally liable for any such damage.106 If adopted, such mea-
sures would greatly facilitate recovery of damages from hazardous
waste generators. Plaintiffs' problems of proof would diminish
greatly, as the proposed directive shifts the evidentiary burden to
potential defendants, and joint and several liability would make it
much easer for plaintiffs to obtain compensation.'
However, this new legislation remains in the proposal stage,
and it is unclear when, if ever, the Council will adopt it.'0 8 There-
fore, the incentive effect of civil litigation in the EC remains specu-
lative. The prospect of crushing liability imposed by courts re-
mains a distant one for EC industry. Thus, toxic tort and
environmental litigation in the EC may not have a highly effective
and persuasive impact on industrial attitudes toward and use of
hazardous chemicals.
B. Predominance of the Democratic Function
Informational remedies in the EC must rely heavily on the
democratic function for their success. By increasing industry's
public accountability and empowering the populace, right-to-know
laws can effectively precipitate public action in the EC. The high
level of toxic chemical use in the EC, combined with the success of
the Green movement, 10 9 suggests that information-driven public
action may prove quite effective.
The role of the "Greens" in European politics reflects the po-
tential for both political activism on environmental issues and
public concern for environmental protection." 0 Individually, how-
,04 Commission Prop for a Council Dir on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
1989 OJ C251:3.
"S5 Id, art 3, 1989 OJ at C251:5.
' Id, art 5, 1989 OJ at C251:5.
107 Michael J. Murphy and Ellen M. Gross, Risk Awareness on Rise in Europe, Prop-
erty & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Management Edition 9, 47 (April 30; 1990).
, 8 Murphy and Gross, however, suggest that Council approval is "virtually inevitable."
Id.
lo9 Andrew Rosenbaum, Being 'Green' Pays Off, Industry Week 62 (Aug 7, 1989). The
Green movement in Europe has been involved in parliamentary politics since 1980 and has
become firmly enmeshed in the region's political landscape. Brad Knickerbocker, Greens
Slowly Work Their Way into U.S. Political Mix, The Christian Science Monitor 8 (Oct 10,
1990).
'10 The multi-party parliamentary systems of the EC countries are also a key factor in
facilitating the growth of Green parties in Europe. Such systems, unlike the American two-
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ever, European nations frequently lag behind the U.S. in environ-
mental regulation.111 Information-based public pressure on indus-
try, both direct and through political institutions, can help fill this
gap between the promising national and supranational political at-
tention that environmental matters receive, and the disappointing
level of substantive environmental regulation.
Public awareness of environmental and health issues already
affects the way that European companies use toxic substances. 2
Beyond the growth of the Green parties, private groups ranging
from local citizens' groups to international organizations, such as
Greenpeace, 1 3 pressure both governments and industry. Under the
Seveso and Information Directives, greater availability of hazard-
ous substance data should encourage both public and industrial in-
itiatives to improve industrial practices.
C. Enforcement
The Seveso Directive and the Information Directive establish
a solid framework for Community right-to-know regimes, requiring
thorough and detailed reporting and creating a potentially exten-
sive public right of access to disclosed information. These Direc-
tives, however, depend heavily on adequate implementation at the
national level. 1 4 National implementation permits various states
to use Community standards to create right-to-know laws that ef-
fectively regulate industry's use of hazardous substances. Unfortu-
nately, domestic implementation may also dilute the impact of the
party system, encourage single issue parties and their candidates. See Dean Lokken, Eu-
rope's Greens Movement Faces Tough Political Road in U.S., Reuters (June 15, 1989).
.. Andrew Gimson, Force that through the Green Fuse Drives the Flower, The Inde-
pendent 20 (Sept 23, 1990). This seems somewhat odd, because a Green movement did not
emerge in the United States until the mid 1980s and remains, today, far from mainstream
politics.
The "Green movement," as distinct from environmentalism, describes the development
of a third political party in the U.S. with a platform favoring, but not limited to, environ-
mental protection. Id. For a discussion of the Green movement in the United States, see
Knickerbocker, The Christian Science Monitor at 8 (cited in note 109); Brad Knickerbocker,
The Greening of the U.S. Political Scene, The Christian Science Monitor 13 (Jan 16, 1992).
"' See Rosenbaum, Industry Week at 62 (cited in note 109). Moreover, American and
multinational firms, particularly aware of the potential ramifications of such public pres-
sure, have often led the way by adopting policies that benefit both the environment and
their corporate images. Id.
113 Business and Environment: Seeing the Green Light, The Economist 88 (Oct 20,
1990); Nazli Choucri, The Global Environment and Multinational Corporations, Technol-
ogy Rev 52, 56 (Apr 1991).
"' See text at notes 36-37.
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Directives, resulting in either no or improper information-driven,
individual action.
Strict enforcement of the reporting requirements and the pro-
visions for public access is crucial to the success of right-to-know
laws in the EC. Such enforcement must be established and carried
out entirely through national legislation. Because of the difficulties
with private litigation in the EC, national governments should en-
sure compliance by establishing thorough, objective, and aggressive
administrative review of industry reporting practices, including
substantial fines and penalties for facilities that violate reporting
requirements." 5
Limited resources and potential agency or government bias
may make national enforcement problematic. The Seveso Directive
seems to account for such difficulties, however: It authorizes na-
tional authorities to evaluate reported information, to request sup-
plemental information, and to conduct on-site inspections.1 6 To
best utilize these provisions, national governments should establish
objective criteria for use in identifying and penalizing violators. An
agency can then collect citizen complaints and evaluate and rank
the complaints against a list of predetermined standards. This
would assist them in allocating limited enforcement resources and
would make biased agency action more difficult.
D. Structuring the Information
The data disclosed must be made available to the public in a
comprehensible manner. Right-to-know laws should seek not just
to maximize public disclosure but also to inform in a manner that
enables rational and accurate decisionmaking.
Although they each contain limited requirements concerning
health and ecological risk data,1 7 the reporting requirements of
both the Seveso Directive and EPCRA focus primarily on generat-
ing raw data. As discussed in Part IV, such unorganized and disor-
derly data present difficulties when individuals are required to
"' United States right-to-know law includes a citizen suit provision, 42 USC
§ 11046(a)(1), which the EPA anticipates will be a significant component of EPCRA en-
forcement. To date, however, private suits have been rare. Conversation with Attorney,
EPA, Chicago, Illinois (Nov 1991).
116 Council Dir 82/501, art 7, 1982 OJ at L230:4 (cited in note 3).
"7 See 42 USC § 11022(d)(1)(A), requiring certain emergency and hazardous chemical
inventory data to be organized according to health and physical hazards; Council Dir 88/610,
annex B, 1988 OJ at L336:18 (cited in note 3), requiring communication to the general pub-
lic of "[gleneral information relating to the nature of the major-accident hazards, including
their potential effects on the population and the environment."
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make uncertain valuations of costs and benefits. The burden of or-
dering and distilling data must fall on someone beyond individual
citizens if right-to-know laws are to succeed in regulating indus-
try's use of hazardous substances.
The national governments, as the enforcers of the reporting
requirements and the collectors of data, are the obvious candidates
to refine raw data for individuals. However, limited administrative
resources suggests the need for independent, learned in-
termediaries. The political importance of environmental issues in
the EC suggests that public interest groups would gladly undertake
the task of refining the raw data.11s Not only can environmental
groups use such data to pressure industry and government, but en-
vironmental groups can also use the data to compile listings and
indices of facilities. 11 9
Equally important, the potential exists for a Community sys-
tem of organizing and analyzing hazardous substance information.
In May 1990, the Council of the European Communities adopted a
regulation establishing the European Environment Agency
("EEA") and the European environment and observation net-
work.12 0 The EEA, an independent agency, 2 ' is designed to collect,
process and analyze data122 and to provide the Member States with
"the objective information necessary for framing and implement-
ing sound and effective environmental policies. 1 23 The regulation
gives the EEA a broad mandate covering a wide array of environ-
mental concerns. 1 2  Finally, the regulation provides that
118 A GAO study of EPCRA's toxic release reporting requirement (42 USC § 11023)
found that environmental and public interest groups have used this data extensively. GAO,
Toxic Chemicals at 25 (cited in note 1).
"' See id. Of course, private industry groups will also have an interest in serving as a
learned intermediary. In the United States, for example, the Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation uses information produced by EPCRA as a basis for annual reports tracking industry
progress in pollution control and other environmental management practices. EPA, Toxics
in the Community at 324 (cited in note 20). Such involvement by private interest groups on
both sides of the issue should help to ensure a balanced presentation of data and should
promote democratic deliberation.
However, interest groups, though significant in filling a void requiring knowledgeable
"middlemen," should not be relied upon as the sole entities performing the learned interme-
diary function. Such a regime guarantees neither consistency nor breadth of coverage. Even
where groups from both sides are involved, slanted analyses may. nevertheless obscure the
true significance of information.
120 Council Reg 1210/90, 1990 OJ L120:1.
Id, preamble, 1990 OJ at L120:1.
122 Id, art 2(i), 1990 OJ at L120:2.
Id, art 2(ii), 1990 OJ at L120:2.
"' See Council Reg 1210/90, art 3(2), 1990 OJ at L120:2 (cited in note 120). The EEA
does not yet exist. It cannot be established until after the Community has selected a site for
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"[e]nvironmental data supplied to or emanating from the [EEA]
may be published and shall be made accessible to the public."1 5
Without stifling governmental and private interest groups in
their activities in distilling and organizing raw data, the creation of
a Community entity designed to handle raw environmental data
will give both structure and support to national efforts. The EEA,
therefore, may be the most efficient learned intermediary: charging
a Community institution with responsibility for processing and as-
sessing hazardous substance data avoids potential duplication and
enables Member States to pool their resources.
CONCLUSION
Effective right-to-know laws are a powerful tool in environ-
mental regulation. Properly implemented, such informational rem-
edies shift the regulatory burden from government to individuals.
Public action based on full and comprehensible information in-
duces changes in industry's use of hazardous substances.
The EC countries currently have the opportunity to use Com-
munity legislation-the Seveso Directive, the Information Direc-
tive, and the regulation establishing the EEA-to develop highly
effective right-to-know regimes. For these to succeed, however,
Member States must establish strict enforcement measures, and
they (and the Community as a whole) must impartially and accu-
rately analyze and organize the data in order to catalyze individual
decisionmaking.
the Agency. Currently, Member States disagree as to the best site for the EEA. Dietrich
Gorny, The European Environment Agency and the Freedom of Environmental Informa-
tion Directive: Potential Cornerstones of EC Environmental Law, 14 BC Intl & Comp L R
279, 293 (1991).
"I Council Reg 1210/90, art 6, 1990 OJ at L120:3 (cited in note 120).
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